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Summary: In 1938, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his law partner Basil 
O’Connor formed the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis (NFIP) to 
battle the viral disease poliomyelitis. Although the NFIP program was purported 
to be available for all Americans irrespective of “race, creed, or color,” officials 
encountered numerous difficulties upholding this pledge in a nation divided 
by race. In 1944, NFIP officials hired educator Charles H. Bynum to head a new 
department of “Negro Activities.” Between 1944 and 1954, Bynum negotiated 
the NFIP bureaucracy to educate officials and influence their national health 
policy. As part of the NFIP team, he helped increase interracial fund-raising in 
the March of Dimes, improve polio treatment for black Americans, and further 
the civil rights movement.
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In 1949, three-year-old Emma Pearl Berry fell ill with polio at her home 
in Raymond, Mississippi.1 As an African American child in the Deep 
South, Berry was too young to appreciate how economics, the politics of 
race, and legalized segregation might undermine her access to medical 
facilities or delay her treatment. However, due to a series of extraordinary 
policies that had been negotiated years earlier, Berry was admitted to the 
Lutheran Hospital in Vicksburg, Mississippi, where she remained under 
the care of medical professionals.2 Her parents, tenant farmers with eleven 
other children, were not required to pay the $1,598 hospital bill. Instead, 
a local chapter of a polio philanthropy, the National Foundation for 
Infantile Paralysis (NFIP), incurred all expenses.3 After her ordeal, Berry 
was selected as a poster child, and her photo was exhibited to encourage 
public donations (Figure 1). In a nation divided by race and plagued by 
health disparities, how was Berry’s treatment made possible?
Prior to the Salk vaccine, children like Berry and their families faced 
the ever-present threat of polio infection.4 Polio (or infantile paralysis) is 
a contagious oral-fecal viral disease that can cause paralysis of the limbs 
and, in severe cases, the respiratory muscles.5 Hospital isolation wards 
facilitated acute polio care and the use of lifesaving equipment. Indeed, 
the “iron lung,” an apparatus developed in the 1930s to assist patients 
suffering from respiratory paralysis, stood as an iconic symbol of the dev-
astation wrought by this disease.6 To restore muscle function and mobility, 
many polio survivors underwent convalescent treatment at facilities spe-
cializing in physical therapy and orthopedic surgery.7 Although time and 
rehabilitation could improve the prognosis, many polio patients endured 
varying degrees of permanent disability.
In January 1938, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his law partner 
Basil O’Connor formed the NFIP to solicit public funds to pay for costly 
polio hospitalization and therapy, as well as specialized medical training, 
1. “1952: Campaign Guide,” Series 1: Campaign Materials, Box 2, Fund Raising Records, 
March of Dimes Archives, White Plains, New York (henceforth denoted as MDA), p. 78.
2. “Polio Swimming Hole in Vicksburg, Mississippi,” Jet Magazine, 24 Jan. 1952, p. 37.
3. “Polio Epidemic Hits Mississippi,” Jet Magazine, 6 Dec. 1951, pp. 14 –15.
4. Marc Shell, Polio and Its Aftermath: The Paralysis of Culture (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2005), p. 140.
5. Frederick C. Robbins, “The History of Polio Vaccine Development,” in Vaccines, Fourth 
Edition, ed. Stanley A. Plotkin and Walter A. Orenstein (Philadelphia: Elsevier, 2004); and 
Michael B. A. Oldstone, Viruses, Plagues, and History (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1998), p. 104.
6. Julie K. Silver and Daniel J. Wilson, Polio Voices (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2007), p. 
38.
7. David M. Oshinsky, Polio: An American Story (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 
pp. 61–64, 73–74.
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Figure 1. Emma Pearl Berry, March of Dimes African Ameri-
can poster child, 1952. Courtesy of the March of Dimes 
Foundation, White Plains, New York.
education programs, and vaccine research. Yet within the context of the 
Great Depression and the Second World War, NFIP officials faced diffi-
culties reaching all Americans. Although their program met the needs 
of white polio patients, responding to the needs of African Americans 
tested their official pledge of ensuring treatment irrespective of “race.”8 
8. David L. Sills, The Volunteers: Means and Ends in a National Organization (Glencoe, Ill.: 
The Free Press, 1957), pp. 48, 136; “To Aid Paralysis Victims,” New York Times, 25 Dec. 1938,
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Black civil rights and black health activism coalesced during these years, 
placing pressure on the NFIP to address racial disparities in its program.9 
While NFIP officials realized some improvements in acute and convales-
cent care, proposals to include black Americans in the wider chapter and 
fund-raising programs were stymied by assumptions, inexperience, and 
prejudice. In a desperate attempt to rectify a worsening financial situa-
tion and meet the challenge posed by civil rights activists, NFIP officials 
hired African American health educator Charles H. Bynum to an execu-
tive role in 1944.10 As head of the newly conceived department of “Negro 
Activities,” Bynum devoted his career to addressing the health needs and 
volunteer aspirations of African Americans in the polio crusade. 
Medical historians have a longstanding interest in the intersection of 
race and disease but have only recently pursued racial politics in relation 
to polio.11 With Polio: An American Story, David Oshinsky brought visibility 
to the issue by examining black Americans’ experiences with polio and 
contributions to its eradication through donations.12 Moreover, Naomi 
Rogers’ important article, “Race and the Politics of Polio,” revealed that 
NFIP sponsorship of a special treatment center at Tuskegee, Alabama, was 
motivated by the growing visibility of black polio patients, civil rights activ-
ism, and the exclusionary admission practices at Georgia Warm Springs.13 
In this essay, I engage with the scholarship by investigating the nature of 
early polio treatment for black Americans, how racism shaped chapter 
membership and fund-raising, and finally, how Bynum negotiated race 
p. 16; and O’Connor to Thomas, 23 May 1938, Series 1, “National Medical Association,” 
Box 14, Pub. Rel. Records, MDA.
9. Susan L. Smith, Sick and Tired of Being Sick and Tired: Black Women’s Health Activism in 
America, 1890–1950 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995); and Vanessa 
Northington Gamble, Making a Place for Ourselves: The Black Hospital Movement, 1920–1945 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
10. “A Celebration of the Life of Charles Hudson Bynum,” Funeral Program, 27 Apr. 
1996, Dianne H. McDonald private collection, New York; and Bernard to Savage, 19 June 
1946, Series 14, Box 13, Med. Prog. Records, MDA.
11. Todd L. Savitt, Medicine and Slavery: The Diseases and Health Care of Blacks in Antebellum 
Virginia (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978); Susan M. Reverby, ed., Tuskegee’s Truths: 
Rethinking the Tuskegee Syphilis Study (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); 
Keith Wailoo, Dying in the City of the Blues: Sickle Cell Anemia and the Politics of Race and Health 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Nayan Shah, Contagious Divides: 
Epidemics and Race in San Francisco’s Chinatown (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2001); and Gwenn M. Jensen, “System Failure: Health-Care Deficiencies in the World War 
II Japanese American Detention Centers,” Bull. Hist. Med., 1999, 73 : 602–28.
12. Oshinsky, Polio: An American Story (n. 7), pp. 2, 88, 145.
13. Naomi Rogers, “Race and the Politics of Polio: Warm Springs, Tuskegee, and the 
March of Dimes,” Am. J. Public Health, 2007, 97 : 784 –95.
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matters in American society and the NFIP bureaucracy to achieve impor-
tant victories. Although Bynum remained at the NFIP until his retirement 
in 1971, the period between 1938 and 1954 provides a unique window 
into evolving race relations when a polio vaccine had yet to be licensed 
and epidemics raged unabated.
Race and the Polio Treatment Program, 1938–1944
NFIP officials championed the provision of acute and convalescent polio 
care “without prejudice against race”; yet the delivery of these services was 
affected by social, political, and economic factors.14 A myth alleging that 
African Americans were less susceptible to polio than white Americans 
contributed to medical neglect.15 The myth was based on observation 
and the initial prevalence of white polio cases, as most epidemics dur-
ing the 1920s and 1930s plagued the urban North and Midwest but not 
the South, where the majority of black Americans lived.16 Once southern 
outbreaks emerged by the late 1930s, African American polio cases were 
often underreported, since isolation and poverty led many families to opt 
for homecare.17 According to Dr. Thomas M. Rivers, a white scientist at 
the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, biased incidence studies 
cloaked the extent of the disease, as, he reasoned, there had been “a ten-
dency in the past not to seek out colored cases, as well as white.”18 More-
over, since most physicians were inadequately trained to recognize polio’s 
multifaceted symptoms, misdiagnosis inadvertently hid countless cases.19 
Therefore, for the first few decades of the twentieth century, black Ameri-
can polio sufferers were “kept invisible” from mainstream society.20
Despite the impression of disproportionate susceptibility, the NFIP 
acute treatment program assured a measure of care for black Americans, 
14. Sills, The Volunteers (n. 8), p. 48; Edith P. Chappell and John F. Hume, “A Black Oasis: 
Tuskegee’s Flight Against Infantile Paralysis, 1941–1975,” Series 4: Historical Studies, Box 
4, History of the NFIP, MDA, p. 41.
15. Rogers, “Race and the Politics of Polio” (n. 13), p. 786; and Wailoo, Dying in the City 
of the Blues (n. 11).
16. Chappell and Hume, “A Black Oasis” (n. 14), pp. 30–31; and Rogers, “Race and the 
Politics of Polio” (n. 13), pp. 784 –85.
17. Bynum to O’Connor, 1 Nov. 1948, Series 14, Box 13, Med. Prog. Records, MDA, p. 
6; and Rogers, “Race and the Politics of Polio” (n. 13), pp. 786–87.
18. Francis to Weaver, 10 Dec. 1946, Series 14: Poliomyelitis, Box 15, Med. Prog. Records, 
MDA.
19. Chappell and Hume, “A Black Oasis” (n. 14), p. 31.
20. Rogers, “Race and the Politics of Polio” (n. 13), p. 793.
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although access varied by region. NFIP chapters donated special equip-
ment, such as respirators and hot pack machines, and paid all expenses 
for patients admitted to either black hospitals or majority-white hospi-
tals.21 Due to chapter financing and the nature of acute care, de facto 
segregated hospitals in northern, western, and midwestern regions began 
to treat African American patients in racially integrated wards.22 Even in 
segregated cities, such as Baltimore, Maryland, the black newspaper Afro-
American reported that there was “No Color Line” in polio care.23 Hospital 
administrators realized that separate isolation wards for different racial-
ized groups were redundant and fiscally prohibitive during an epidemic.24 
Moreover, as treatment expenses were covered by the NFIP, hospitals were 
reimbursed regardless of a patient’s financial means.25
In the South, acute polio hospitalization was affected by local customs, 
segregation laws, and access to black medical facilities. African American 
orthopedic surgeon Dr. John Hume explained that at segregated hospitals, 
black patients “were put in separate waiting rooms and had to wait ‘til 
all the white patients were seen. Or they put them in the basement, and 
then had to have the parents nurse them.”26 Rare exceptions occurred 
during the epidemic of 1944, when some hospitals in the Upper South 
temporarily forestalled segregation. In fact, NFIP personnel set up racially 
integrated wards at their improvised polio hospital in Hickory, North 
Carolina.27 Furthermore, the Medical College of Virginia Hospital in 
Richmond opened its isolation ward to a black polio patient.28 However, 
21. Bynum to Department Heads, Miscellaneous Facts, 1941–1951, Series 14, Box 13, 
Med. Prog. Records, MDA; and Christopher Lasch, “Chapter XI: Aid to Negro Institutions, 
1956,” Series 1, Box 2, History of NFIP Records, MDA, p. 15. Christopher Lasch (1939–94) 
would later become an American cultural historian at the University of Rochester.
22. “Bynum, Charles—January 15, 1988,” Series 1: Interview Transcripts [uncorrected 
version], Box 1, Oral History Records, MDA, p. 5; Oshinsky, Polio: An American Story (n. 7), 
pp. 69–72; David W. Rose, Images of America: March of Dimes (Charleston, S.C.: Arcadia, 2003), 
pp. 24 –25; Shell, Polio and Its Aftermath (n. 4), p. 202; and “Campaign Beneficiaries,” Baltimore 
Afro-American, 3 Feb. 1942, p. 17. It is not known how black American patients were treated 
once they were admitted to these facilities.
23. “No Color Line in Baltimore Polio Hospital,” Baltimore Afro-American, 26 Jan. 1946, 
p. 28.
24. Heather Green Wooten, “The Polio Years in Harris and Galveston Counties, 1930–
1962,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Galveston, 2006), p. 143.
25. Sills, The Volunteers (n. 8), p. 45; and Victor Cohn, Four Billion Dimes (Minneapolis: 
Minneapolis Star and Tribune, 1955), p. 60.
26. Nina Gilden Seavey, Jane S. Smith, and Paul Wagner, eds., A Paralyzing Fear: The Tri-
umph over Polio in America (New York: TV Books, 1998), pp. 157–61, quotation on p. 157.
27. Schell, Polio and Its Aftermath (n. 4), p. 202; and Miracle at Hickory (New York: National 
Foundation for Infantile Paralysis, 1944), MDA.
28. “Total of 197 Polio Cases in Virginia,” The Bee, 9 Aug. 1944, p. 2.
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such practices were possible only during a crisis and would not likely have 
been tolerated in the Deep South.29
While region defined the boundaries of acute care for African Ameri-
cans, convalescent treatment was restricted across the nation.30 The 
exclusionary admission policies of most white physical therapy centers 
combined with the shortage of suitably equipped black facilities resulted 
in variable and often inadequate care.31 Among the few convalescent 
treatment centers open to black Americans in the late 1930s were the 
Texas Gonzales Warm Springs and the Texas Scottish Rite Hospital.32 
White polio patients, conversely, benefited from a range of rehabilita-
tion options, including the famous Georgia Warm Springs. Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, himself a polio survivor, purchased the derelict Warm Springs 
facility in April 1926 for $201,677 and reopened it for convalescent 
care.33 To offset the considerable expense of maintaining the center and 
its program, Roosevelt founded the Georgia Warm Springs Foundation 
to solicit monetary contributions from his Democratic Party supporters. 
For many disabled polio patients, Warm Springs became a potent symbol 
of hope. For civil rights advocates, however, Warm Springs remained a 
stark reminder of medical racism, since the facility admitted only white 
patients.34
During the 1930s through 1950s, African Americans challenged racial 
segregation and exclusion through activism and education campaigns. 
Black journalists critiqued the white establishment and drew attention 
to the persisting inequalities.35 The black health movement, spurred by 
African American sorority women, physicians, dentists, and nurses, paral-
leled this movement. Lay health workers established public health clinics 
29. Bynum to Department Heads, 18 Jan. 1945, Series 14, Box 13, Med. Prog. Records, 
MDA. This issue requires further scholarly attention.
30. “Paralysis Center Set Up for Negroes,” New York Times, 22 May 1939, p. 15.
31. Green Wooten, “The Polio Years” (n. 24), pp. 70–77; and Gamble, Making a Place 
for Ourselves (n. 9).
32. “Negro Polio Victims Get Foundation Aid,” New York Times, 21 Dec. 1945, p. 13; and 
Green Wooten, “The Polio Years” (n. 24), pp. 38–39, 75–77.
33. Oshinsky, Polio: An American Story (n. 7), pp. 38–39; Naomi Rogers, Dirt and Disease: 
Polio before FDR (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1992), p. 168; and Jane S. 
Smith, Patenting the Sun: Polio and the Salk Vaccine (New York: William Morrow, 1990), pp. 
57–61.
34. Cohn, Four Billion Dimes (n. 25), p. 51; and Chapter XI, “Part 2: Final Draft, Volume 
1, Book 2: National Administration and Policies of the NFIP,” Series 1, Box 2, History of 
NFIP Records, MDA, p. 460.
35. Wallace Terry, Missing Pages: Black Journalists of Modern America: An Oral History (New 
York: Carroll & Graf, 2007); and Gene Roberts and Hank Klibanoff, The Race Beat: The Press, 
the Civil Rights Struggle, and the Awakening of a Nation (New York: Random House, 2006).
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in neglected areas of the rural South, and black health educators, such 
as Roscoe C. Brown of the U.S. Public Health Service, promoted Booker 
T. Washington’s famous National Negro Health Week Movement.36 Black 
physicians with the National Medical Association (NMA) and nurses with 
the National Association of Colored Graduate Nurses fostered alliances 
with white philanthropies and government to improve the health system 
and erode medical racism.37 Although ideologically divided and ultimately 
unsuccessful in eradicating the vestiges of discrimination in health care, 
leaders such as nurse Mabel Keaton Staupers, Dr. Paul Cornely, and Dr. 
Montague Cobb set the basis for later legislative change and hospital 
desegregation.38
Within this context of rising activism, the exclusionary admission policy 
of Warm Springs caught the attention of black journalists.39 A 1936 Balti-
more Afro-American article criticized Roosevelt and voiced dismay about the 
hypocrisy of the Warm Springs Foundation in light of African American 
participation in raising funds for the organization: “The record shows 
that since he has been President, [Roosevelt] has collected millions of 
dollars for the Warm Springs Foundation, much of which money came 
from Negroes. Yet, poor, crippled Negro boys and girls, suffering from 
infantile paralysis, are not even admitted to this Foundation.”40
Such negative attention persisted through 1937 with an Afro-American 
article quoting Warm Springs’ director Keith Morgan: “because the Warm 
Springs foundation maintains no wards nor clinics, and no separate 
rooms, pools, or general medical facilities, colored patients cannot be 
admitted.”41 When the NFIP commenced operations in 1938, it inherited 
responsibility for Warm Springs and its unresolved race relations issue.
36. Roscoe C. Brown, “The National Negro Health Week Movement,” J. Negro Educ., 
1937, 6 : 553–64; and Smith, Sick and Tired (n. 9), chap. 3.
37. Gamble, Making a Place for Ourselves (n. 9).
38. P. Preston Reynolds, “The Federal Government’s Use of Title VI and Medicare to 
Racially Integrate Hospitals in the United States, 1963 Through 1967,” Am. J. Public Health, 
1997, 87 : 1850–58; Vanessa N. Gamble, “Black Autonomy Versus White Control: Black 
Hospitals and the Dilemmas of White Philanthropy, 1920–1940,” Minerva: A Review of Sci-
ence, Learning and Policy, 1997, 35 : 247–67; and Darlene Clark Hine, Black Women in White: 
Racial Conflict and Cooperation in the Nursing Profession, 1890–1950 (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1989).
39. “The Truth Shall Make You Free! Heed the Truth, You Who are Thinking of Voting 
for Franklin D. Roosevelt,” Baltimore Afro-American, 12 Oct. 1936, p. 3; and “Warm Springs 
Can’t Admit Colored,” Baltimore Afro-American, 30 Jan. 1937, p. 7.
40. “The Truth Shall Make You Free!” (n. 39), p. 3.
41. “Warm Springs Can’t Admit Colored” (n. 39), p. 7.
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Efforts to effect change led some black activists with the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and 
the National Urban League to lobby higher offices.42 Indeed, National 
Urban League southern field director Jesse O. Thomas wrote to Eleanor 
Roosevelt, citing that “any effort made toward including [African Ameri-
cans] in the general program of curing and preventing [polio] would 
be heartily welcomed.”43 Mrs. Roosevelt championed civil rights issues 
and avidly pursued them with her husband, who in turn appreciated the 
political implications of black activism as reflected in the appointment of 
his “Black Cabinet” composed of African American professionals.44 When 
Mrs. Roosevelt forwarded her husband a letter in 1938 concerning the 
treatment needs of a black polio patient, President Roosevelt relayed it on 
to Basil O’Connor with a note: “Is there anything we can do about this?”45 
O’Connor thus found himself under increasing pressure to reform the 
treatment program.
African American physicians with the NMA and the Julius Rosenwald 
Fund philanthropy took an early lead in helping the NFIP negotiate the 
terrain of segregated medicine. In January 1938, black physician Dr. Mid-
ian Othello Bousfield met with O’Connor to discuss a potential solution. 
Bousfield had considerable experience working for the improvement 
of black medical institutions and believed in the importance of white 
philanthropy to further the black health movement. A 1909 graduate of 
Northwestern University Medical School, Bousfield had once served as 
president and later as a commission chairperson to the NMA. He devel-
oped close connections with white philanthropic organizations, and by 
1935 he had become director of the Negro Health Division at the Julius 
Rosenwald Fund in Chicago, Illinois.46 Bousfield did not lobby for the 
integration of Warm Springs; instead, he advocated the development of 
a separate treatment facility for black Americans as an interim step, as he 
believed that racial integration would be “slow and painful.”47 After the 
meeting, O’Connor explained: “[Dr. Bousfield] came in the interest of 
what he termed ‘a Negro Warm Springs.’ The plan which he put before 
42. Rogers, “Race and the Politics of Polio” (n. 13), p. 787.
43. Chappell and Hume, “A Black Oasis” (n. 14), p. 41.
44. Harvard Sitkoff, A New Deal for Blacks: The Emergence of Civil Rights as a National Issue: 
The Depression Decade (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978); and John B. Kirby, Black 
Americans in the Roosevelt Era: Liberalism and Race (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 
1980).
45. Chappell and Hume, “A Black Oasis” (n. 14), p. 41.
46. Gamble, Making a Place for Ourselves (n. 9), pp. 40, 110; and Smith, Sick and Tired 
(n. 9), p. 63.
47. Gamble, Making a Place for Ourselves (n. 9), pp. 109–11.
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me has been gone over several times and is now in the hands of a special 
committee. . . . While neither Dr. Bousfield nor I have attempted secrecy 
in these negotiations, we have rather felt that perhaps the matter should 
not be flushed to the public until we had had an opportunity to deter-
mine whether we could come to a mutually satisfactory agreement.”48 For 
O’Connor, establishing an all-black treatment facility promised to deflect 
some of the criticism over the segregated Warm Springs while serving as 
concrete proof of the NFIP’s ability to uphold its pledge of unbiased care. 
Despite the apparent benefits of Bousfield’s plan, O’Connor urged cau-
tion, since the establishment of a new treatment facility would not only 
incur considerable expense to the fledgling NFIP but also force officials 
to publicly engage in a politically charged issue over segregation.49
While NFIP officials considered the prospect of a “Negro Warm 
Springs,” NMA physicians added momentum to the cause. On 14 May 
1938, NMA’s executive chairperson, Dr. W. McHinley Thomas, wrote 
to the NFIP inquiring whether there were plans “for establishing clinic 
centers for the training of the Negro physician to do his share in the 
eradication” of polio.50 Thomas pledged “full cooperation” and suggested 
the Tuskegee Institute as a suitable location for a clinic due to the capa-
bilities of its resident orthopedic surgeon. An additional proposal came 
from NMA physician Dr. John T. Givens, who recommended a site in Hot 
Springs, Arkansas, which was to be named after Mrs. Roosevelt because 
of her “great humanitarian interest.”51
Due to the convergence of black press critiques, private appeals, Bous-
field’s counsel, NMA lobbying, and the special interests of the NFIP, a 
separate polio treatment and training facility for black Americans was 
made a reality. It was perhaps not surprising that the NFIP selected the 
Tuskegee Institute as the site for the new center. Founded in 1881 by 
Booker T. Washington as an educational institution for African Ameri-
cans, the Tuskegee Institute had established medical facilities and an 
orthopedic specialist on staff, as well as a history of cooperation with white 
philanthropic institutions and the federal government.52 On 22 May 1939, 
48. Christopher Lasch, “Chapter XI: Aid to Negro Institutions, 1956” (n. 21), p. 7.
49. “Paralysis Center Set Up for Negroes” (n. 30); and Jeanne L. Brand, “Chapter II: The 
Response to Developing Problems of Medical Care, 1940–1946,” Series 1, Box 2, History of 
NFIP Records, MDA, pp. 88–90.
50. Thomas to NFIP, 14 May 1938, Series 1, “National Medical Association,” Box 14, Pub. 
Rel. Records, MDA; and Lasch, “Chapter XI: Aid to Negro Institutions” (n. 21), p. 6b.
51. Givens to Warm Springs, 11 Oct. 1938, Series 1, “National Medical Association,” Box 
14, Pub. Rel. Records, MDA.
52. Henry S. Enck, “Tuskegee Institute and Northern White Philanthropy: A Case Study 
in Fund Raising, 1900–1915,” J. Negro Hist., 1980, 65 : 336–48; Chappell and Hume, “A Black 
Oasis” (n. 14), p. xii; and Reverby, Tuskegee’s Truths (n. 11).
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Basil O’Connor announced the approval of a $161,350 grant to Tuskegee 
Institute’s John A. Andrew Memorial Hospital to “build, equip, and main-
tain for one year” a thirty-six-bed “infantile paralysis center for Negroes.”53 
This was the first grant that NFIP officials awarded a black institution and 
the only grant they ever made for a construction project.54
The Tuskegee grant demonstrated both the success of the African 
American health movement in agitating for needed facilities and the 
desire of NFIP officials to close gaps in their treatment program. Yet the 
actions of NFIP officials also highlighted a belief that they were in no 
position to challenge segregation but should work within the existing 
social framework and provide a parallel infrastructure. Funding separate 
black institutions followed decades of similar efforts by other white phi-
lanthropies, including the Julius Rosenwald Fund, Duke Endowment, 
and Rockefeller General Education Board.55 Indeed, the patronage of an 
all-black facility became an expedient solution to addressing black health 
needs in a segregated society.
As long as Warm Springs continued to cater primarily to a white clien-
tele, however, the provision of a construction grant to Tuskegee divided 
African American communities and fueled ongoing resentment.56 With 
the Tuskegee Infantile Paralysis Center under construction, some African 
American journalists continued their onslaught against Warm Springs 
as a symbol of persisting inequality. Although Mrs. Roosevelt’s personal 
insistence had led Warm Springs personnel to admit a small number of 
black polio patients by the 1940s, their segregated treatment and housing 
conditions remained far from ideal.57 In September 1940, an Afro-American 
reporter visited Warm Springs and observed: “This sanitarium for infan-
tile paralysis victims has one colored patient, and 40 colored employees 
receiving from $4.50 to $7.50 per week. This sole colored patient, said to 
be in a serious condition, is treated and housed in a small basement room, 
the only place provided for the colored sick.”58 Such journalistic critiques 
53. “Paralysis Center Set Up for Negroes” (n. 30).
54. Lasch, “Chapter XI: Aid to Negro Institutions” (n. 21), p. 11.
55. Gamble, Making a Place for Ourselves (n. 9).
56. Divisiveness was common during the black health movement when white philanthro-
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were readily engaged by Bousfield, who proved to be an important ally in 
defending the NFIP against the charges of some African Americans who 
insisted on the integration of Warm Springs.59 If progress was to be made 
in the provision of polio care, Bousfield considered it best not to attack 
the NFIP but to work with its staff to fulfill the immediate health needs 
of African Americans.60 Although not everyone agreed, the concept of a 
separate facility at Tuskegee slowly gained acceptance.
When the Tuskegee Infantile Paralysis Center opened on 15 January 
1941, it was a poor imitation of Warm Springs, which in contrast boasted 
a sizable contingent of experienced medical and surgical staff, expansive 
treatment facilities, and resort-style accommodations. Despite its limita-
tions, orthopedic chief Dr. John W. Chenault gushed with approval over 
the “three-story, fireproof building, equipped with the latest facilities 
for the care of crippled children.”61 One of its charges was black polio 
survivor Clara Yelder of Prattville, Alabama, who remembered: “I was in 
Tuskegee for at least a year and a half. . . . I was fitted with my braces and 
I actually got up on crutches. . . . Tuskegee was an oasis for black medical 
care. . . . And the work at the polio unit resulted in the training of black 
physical therapists . . . and it even informed physicians.”62 The center was 
ultimately a mixed success, sustaining the career interests of black medi-
cal professionals, the health needs of black patients, and the credibility 
of the NFIP.
Race, Chapters, and the March of Dimes, 1938–1944
NFIP officials encountered numerous obstacles forging interracial coop-
eration between their two distinct grassroots organizations: the county 
chapters and the March of Dimes (MOD). The county chapters, staffed 
by volunteer committees, were responsible for implementing the NFIP 
program at the local level, including the payment of all medical treatment 
expenses associated with polio.63 The “March of Dimes,” coined by the 
famous Hollywood comedian Eddie Cantor in reference to the popular 
“March of Time” newsreels, was the fund-raising arm of the NFIP.64 Unlike 
59. Lasch, “Chapter XI: Aid to Negro Institutions” (n. 21), p. 10.
60. Bousfield to Pittsburgh Courier, 9 Dec. 1940 as cited in Lasch, “Chapter XI: Aid to 
Negro Institutions” (n. 21), p. 9.
61. Chappell and Hume, “A Black Oasis” (n. 14), pp. 52, 58.
62. Clara Yelder in A Paralyzing Fear (n. 26), pp. 154 –55.
63. Sills, The Volunteers (n. 8), pp. 22–25.
64. Cohn, Four Billion Dimes (n. 25), p. 52; “Dimes Are Sought in Paralysis Drive,” New 
York Times, 24 Jan. 1938, p. 23; and Smith, Patenting the Sun (n. 33), p. 73.
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county chapters, the MOD did not exist all year but was reconstituted in 
early January and active only for the duration of the campaign (usually 
from January 14 to 31).65 The challenge in this two-week period was to 
amass sufficient funds to fulfill the NFIP’s growing mandate. Unlike the 
Ford, Carnegie, or Rockefeller Foundations, the NFIP was not endowed 
by a wealthy patron; in fact, it began its operation with limited funds and 
ended most years nearly broke or running a deficit.66
When the chapter system was introduced in 1938, only white Americans 
were invited to serve on local volunteer committees. Since chapters were 
operated by and for county citizens, most committee members inher-
ited the prevailing values upholding racial segregation and exclusion. 
Although O’Connor advised that “it would be better wherever possible 
to add committees on Negro participation to the present chapters,” he 
was reluctant to enforce the policy for fear of antagonizing white support-
ers.67 “You couldn’t have an integrated chapter; there were no integrated 
chapters,” remembered southern regional director Warren Kingsbury.68 
As most counties had a white chapter by 1942, there was little impetus 
for black Americans to set up competing unofficial chapters devoid of 
resources or recognition. However, one rare exception occurred in Macon 
County, Alabama, when the local Tuskegee chapter was founded on 20 
November 1940, with a committee composed of African Americans.69 
Since Tuskegee was already a center for black polio treatment and NFIP 
sponsorship, the establishment of a chapter was a logical decision for local 
black professionals.70 In spite of its notable success, the Tuskegee chap-
ter was reportedly not recognized by NFIP headquarters as a legitimate 
entity.71 White chapter opposition and the potential for administrative 
redundancy may have informed this deliberate oversight.
Mirroring county chapter origins, the MOD campaign was conceived 
as a volunteer movement for white Americans. The exclusion of black 
volunteers was by no means limited to the southern states but persisted 
in northern centers, including New York City.72 However, in a desperate 
effort to offset spiraling polio treatment costs, some white campaign chair-
65. Sills, The Volunteers (n. 8), p. 39.
66. Smith, Patenting the Sun (n. 33), p. 69.
67. O’Connor to Staff, 27 Mar 1942, Series 14, Box 13, Med. Prog. Records, MDA.
68. “Kingsbury, Warren—November 13, 1987,” Series 1: Interview Transcripts [uncor-
rected version], Box 1, Oral History Records, MDA, pp. 29–30.
69. Bynum to Van Riper, 21 May 1946, Series 14, Box 13, Med. Prog. Records, MDA.
70. “Original Chapter Members,” 20 Nov. 1940, Chapter Personnel, Alabama, Tuskegee 
Institute (Macon County), MDA.
71. Bynum to Van Riper, 21 May 1946, Series 14, Box 13, Med. Prog. Records, MDA.
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persons began to invite the limited participation of African Americans 
in fund-raising activities by 1943.73 Under this ad hoc system, segregated 
cultural practices were upheld as black volunteers were barred from cam-
paign planning committees and canvassed only their own communities.74 
In spite of limited resources and meager publicity, black Americans rec-
ognized that the NFIP provided a vital treatment program and wanted to 
support the cause.75 Indeed, African Americans formed unofficial MOD 
organizations to alleviate isolation from the white campaign and to coor-
dinate their own volunteers.76 The increased revenue promised by MOD 
fund-raising in black communities thus inspired rare instances of inter-
racial cooperation.
The spawning of unofficial black American fund-raising campaigns 
was a dilemma for NFIP headquarters officials. Among the benefits was 
increased revenue without the enforcement of new policies or the provi-
sion of additional resources. In addition, each white campaign committee 
could decide whether or not to instigate such a program. The disadvan-
tages, however, slowly became apparent, as black fund-raisers grew increas-
ingly disillusioned by the persistence of segregation and the lack of recog-
nition of their efforts.77 Revenue potential was also restricted, since most 
white campaign directors in large urban centers, such as Houston, Texas, 
stridently resisted any interracial fund-raising.78 As campaign frustrations 
simmered, headquarters officials turned to confront the issue.
A national effort to include black Americans in the MOD developed 
out of a culmination of internal and external circumstances. First, the 
monetary demands on the NFIP were critical by 1944, owing to the rising 
incidence of polio at 19,029 reported cases. In fact, one specific epidemic 
that year in Hickory, North Carolina, required the NFIP to allocate over 
$400,000 to treat 454 polio patients (a rate of $881 per capita, or 1/30 
of their 1944 gross income).79 The need for revenue pressed executives 
to explore new options and take more risks. Second, the upswing of civil 
rights lobbying during the Second World War drew attention to the influ-
ence of black Americans and their importance to the war effort. Black 
soldiers incensed by their second-class status serving in segregated units 
73. Bynum to O’Connor, 5 Mar 1945, Series 14, Box 13, Med. Prog. Records, MDA; and 
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75. “Bynum, Charles—January 15, 1988” (n. 22), p. 17.
76. Green Wooten, “The Polio Years” (n. 24), pp. 123–24.
77. “Bynum, Charles—January 15, 1988” (n. 22), p. 1.
78. Bynum to O’Connor, 5 Mar. 1945, Series 14, Box 13, Med. Prog. Records, MDA.
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Racial Politics and the NFIP, 1938–1954 231
and black workers disillusioned by prejudicial employment practices 
at home pressured federal and state politicians to address racism and 
the need for equitable conditions. As southern NAACP field secretary 
Madison Jones explained, the Second World War “caused the Negro to 
change almost instantly from a fundamentally defensive attitude to one of 
offense.”80 Aided by white liberals but led by black journalists and union 
leaders, such as A. Philip Randolph, the so-called “Double-V” program 
linked African Americans’ war against fascism in Europe with racism at 
home.81 The publicity generated by these activities not only influenced 
national organizations and the military but also led to federal conces-
sions, including the Fair Employment Practice Committee established by 
President Roosevelt in 1941.82 A change in prevailing attitudes was also 
spurred when NFIP officials learned of a potentially divisive polio fund-
raising campaign rooted in black communities embittered by their lack 
of recognition. In particular, African American volunteers in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania, refused to relinquish funds they had gathered in their com-
munity to the local white Allegheny County chapter. Headquarters officials 
feared that these volunteers intended to send contributions directly to 
the Tuskegee Institute and bypass the MOD entirely.83 This impending 
development held serious implications for the NFIP, since it could serve 
as a precedent for a competing polio fund-raising movement.
Although O’Connor appreciated the immediate need to reduce exclu-
sionary practices in the MOD, he was uncertain how to proceed. He had 
reviewed many proposals over the years, but none were entirely satisfactory 
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or risk-free. It was through the NFIP’s close association with the Tuskegee 
Institute that a solution was brought forward. Tuskegee’s Dr. Chenault 
understood the incredible costs associated with polio treatment and the 
NFIP’s chronic need for funds. In May 1944, he wrote to NFIP officials 
explaining that since their organization was “not getting to the great mass 
of Negroes” during the fund-raising campaign, they were “not getting the 
financial support” that they “should have.” To increase revenue, Chenault 
suggested that the NFIP employ “a qualified person to direct and make 
contacts among Negroes” in the forthcoming 1945 campaign.84 He recom-
mended Charles H. Bynum, then assistant to the Tuskegee President, as 
an ideal person to fulfill this role. Civil rights lobbying, a grave financial 
situation, and the demonstrated agency of black volunteers, brought an 
executive role at the NFIP for a black American closer to reality.
“A Qualified Person”
Charles Hudson Bynum II came to the attention of NFIP officials in 1944, 
at a time when relations with African American communities were unsta-
ble and the need for funds was critical. The NFIP sought a candidate that 
had sufficient education and diplomatic skills as well as an awareness of 
the political and social climate of the United States. Bynum was born on 
11 November 1905, in Kinston, North Carolina, to African American par-
ents.85 He was educated at black institutions to a college level and received 
graduate training at majority-white northern and western universities. He 
earned a Master of Arts degree in 1929 from the University of Pennsyl-
vania and pursued advanced studies at the universities of Minnesota and 
California.86 During the Great Depression, Bynum found employment as 
a lecturer at black secondary and college institutions in Kentucky, Okla-
homa, North Carolina, and Texas.87 He next moved into administrative 
roles, first as director of North Texas Extension Schools in 1934 and later 
as dean of Texas College in 1939.88 Through these peregrinations, Bynum 
acquired a diverse liberal arts background, management experience, and 
an awareness of regionalism.
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Following the approach exemplified by Tuskegee Institute president 
Dr. Robert R. Moton, Bynum engaged in civil rights activities that were 
manifested within the existing social system and rooted in the black 
middle-class tradition of championing education and interracial coopera-
tion.89 His first foray into a number of civil rights projects began when 
he was teaching in Louisville, Kentucky. He discovered that writers at the 
New York Times had changed “the spelling of Negro from small case ‘n’ to 
a capital.”90 Upon inquiry, Bynum learned that Dr. Moton had requested 
the alteration, which the Times editor duly acknowledged in a 7 March 
1930, editorial as “not merely a typographical change . . . [but] an act in 
recognition of racial self-respect for those who have been for generations 
in the ‘lower case.’”91 Bynum promoted the movement by lobbying editors 
of white newspapers, including those in Kentucky and later in Oklahoma 
and Texas, to revise their typographical policies to reflect those of the 
Times. Moreover, Bynum wrote provocative newspaper columns, first in the 
Louisville Courier Journal and then in the Dallas Express. Many of his articles 
dealt with the nature of race relations, including an October 1936 Express 
article in which he criticized black officials at the Hall of Negro Life as 
“Uncle Toms” who were complicit in Jim Crowism.92 Due to his enduring 
interest in advancing racial equality and to his personal connections with 
civil rights groups, Bynum joined the social justice organization the Com-
mission for Inter-racial Cooperation (CIC) in 1942, where he served as a 
field secretary. Formed in 1919 by white and black community leaders in 
response to racial violence and lynchings across the southern states, the 
CIC devoted its resources to improving the social conditions of African 
Americans.93 Through his experiences in civil rights journalism and lob-
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bying, Bynum became intimately aware of the varied manifestations of 
prejudice and adept at applying measured techniques to incite change.
In 1943, Bynum’s career shifted once more when he agreed to serve as 
the personal assistant to Tuskegee Institute president Dr. F. D. Patterson. 
Patterson likely sought the professional support of Bynum because of his 
exemplary service with the CIC and experience as an educator. 94 How-
ever, it soon became apparent that Bynum and Patterson did not have 
compatible personalities and consequently were “not getting along.”95 
Dr. Chenault became aware of the situation and thought it best to recom-
mend the well-qualified Bynum to the NFIP rather than see the situation 
at Tuskegee deteriorate. Patterson agreed to relinquish Bynum and sent 
him to New York City for an interview at NFIP headquarters.96 Bynum’s 
initial impression of the NFIP was clouded in uncertainty, as no one told 
him why he was being considered or what to expect. When asked years 
later whether he thought NFIP officials needed someone like him, Bynum 
answered: “the Foundation didn’t think so. Actually, no one really knew 
why I went to the Foundation.”97 Despite the absence of a clear vision for 
Bynum, NFIP officials offered him an executive position to commence 
on 1 November 1944.
After years spent struggling to devise a solution to mounting race rela-
tions issues, the NFIP had taken an important step by hiring Bynum as 
director of “Negro Activities.” However, like most national health fund-
raising organizations during the 1940s, including the American Cancer 
Society and the National Tuberculosis Association, the NFIP had limited 
experience hiring African Americans to managerial roles. Employing 
Bynum was in many respects an experiment. Bynum’s first months were 
challenging, as he attempted to carve out a niche, build working relation-
ships with staff, and devise a viable program to address racial disparities.
Addressing the Polio Treatment Disparity, 1944 –1954
Among Bynum’s first pursuits at the NFIP was to help restructure the epi-
demic preparedness program and work toward dismantling prejudiced 
Interracial Cooperation and the Southern Regional Council, 1919–1954” (Ph.D. thesis, 
University of Virginia, 1993); and Ann Wells Ellis, “‘Uncle Sam Is My Shepherd’: The Com-
mission on Interracial Cooperation and the New Deal in Georgia,” Atlanta Hist. J., Spring 
1986, 30 : 47–63.
94. “Bynum, Charles—January 15, 1988” (n. 22), p. 2.
95. Ibid., p. 4.
96. Ibid., p. 1.
97. Ibid.
Racial Politics and the NFIP, 1938–1954 235
admission policies in southern hospitals.98 Under his guidance, NFIP 
officials pressed state and hospital authorities to develop contingency 
planning for the acute care of black polio patients. Mounting epidemics 
and a changing national mood ascribed to Cold War race politics and the 
Hill-Burton Hospital Act added further incentives to realize ward integra-
tion.99 By 1947, Bynum observed that most southern health officials had 
“anticipated problems of race in medical care and made adequate prepa-
rations for the treatment of Negro patients.”100 In the following year, some 
southern hospitals began to desegregate their acute treatment wards. The 
Jefferson Davis Hospital in Houston, Texas, extended care to patients of 
all races in 1948.101 Moreover, policy at the Southwestern Poliomyelitis 
Respiratory Center, which opened in 1951, stipulated that all patients 
be placed in the same ward irrespective of “sex, age, race, residence, or 
financial status.”102 The combination of concerted NFIP initiatives, severe 
polio outbreaks, and federal legislation slowly improved black Americans’ 
access to acute polio care.
To enhance the quality and availability of convalescent polio treatment, 
Bynum sought a diversified funding program aimed at several black medi-
cal institutions.103 In particular, he favored sponsorship of black nursing 
schools, as well as of “one or both of the Negro medical schools,” to enable 
them to “develop their orthopedic, pediatric, and research services.”104 
He drew attention to existing weaknesses and bemoaned the Tuskegee 
Infantile Paralysis Center as poorly managed and unable to “justify the 
per capita educational cost.”105 He explained that the facility was “under-
staffed” and plagued by a litany of administrative conflicts, poor train-
ing, and “false economies.”106 According to Bynum, sustained largesse to 
Tuskegee alone was not only a disappointing investment but reinforced 
the fallacy “that all Negro victims of infantile paralysis [were] . . . treated 
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at Tuskegee.”107 He reasoned that expanding NFIP patronage to incorpo-
rate a full spectrum of black institutions would strengthen the treatment 
infrastructure across the nation and assure favorable publicity.
Bynum recognized that his lack of formal medical training could 
undermine the reception of his policy recommendations. To compensate 
for this deficiency, he obtained permission in June 1946 to hire African 
American physician Dr. Paul B. Cornely to consult over four weeks and 
develop a custom report outlining methods to improve black polio treat-
ment.108 Cornely proved to be a strategic choice, as he was well qualified 
and a firm believer in the black health movement.109 A 1931 University of 
Michigan Medical School graduate, Cornely was the first black American 
to receive a doctorate in public health in 1934.110 Bynum presumed that 
with Cornely’s report he would have the credibility, data, and “means to 
implement and complement health improvement programs and services” 
for “Negro victims of infantile paralysis.”111 Cornely’s thirty-five-page study, 
completed on 9 August 1946, was a fusion of Bynum’s personal agenda 
and Cornely’s professional vision for medical patronage. In particular, he 
advised NFIP officials to support “Negro professional organizations and 
schools,” as black physicians provided “the medical care for the greater 
portion of the 13 million Negroes.” 112 He also encouraged working with 
the NMA to establish special publications and educational symposiums 
on polio. Like Bynum, Cornely called for additional funding of Howard 
University Medical School and Meharry Medical College to expand their 
orthopedic and pediatric programs. Although the orientation of the 
report favored black medical training and eclipsed the professional needs 
of black nurses and the health needs of other minority groups, the report 
justified Bynum’s overall concept of diversified sponsorship.
NFIP officials’ reception of Cornely’s report met with mixed results. 
Indeed, the process of determining where to dispense funds beyond 
Tuskegee frustrated NFIP grant committees, whose members appeared to 
have favored concentrating capital at one or two facilities instead of dis-
seminating smaller grants more widely. Through this transitional period, 
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Bynum served as both an advocate for the financial interests of black 
medical institutions and a guide for wary NFIP officials. In 1946, grant 
committees began to follow some of Bynum’s proposals so that, by 1954, 
nearly $373,000 had been allocated for the training of 211 black medical 
professionals.113 In addition, $1 million was granted for medical educa-
tion programs at leading black institutions, including Meharry Medical 
College, Howard University, and Dillard University. In spite of Bynum’s 
resistance, sponsorship of Tuskegee continued as a priority for the NFIP 
with endowments in excess of $3 million through 1954.114 The ongoing 
preference for Tuskegee stemmed not only from prior investment and 
established services but from Basil O’Connor’s election to its Board of 
Trustees in 1942 and subsequently to chairperson in 1946.115 In spite of 
the concentration of capital at Tuskegee, a greater openness to Bynum’s 
ideas brought the NFIP program into alignment with proponents of the 
black health movement.
Marketing Racial Identification and Integration, 1944 –1954
Bynum believed that the absence of suitable advertising materials for a 
black audience fueled misconceptions about the NFIP as a white organiza-
tion primarily concerned with the needs of white Americans. He reasoned 
that only when the NFIP visually incorporated black subjects into publicity 
materials would the majority of African Americans appreciate the NFIP’s 
diversity and relevance to their communities. Bynum therefore conceived 
and lobbied for a comprehensive marketing strategy endorsing civil rights 
themes of racial “identification and integration” to challenge the notion 
of the white American as the universal subject.116
In January 1946, NFIP publications committee officials released the 
first national MOD poster depicting a white child polio survivor striding 
confidently forward under the slogan “Your dimes did this for me!”117 
Because Bynum believed that the image of a white child did not provide 
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African Americans with a sense of identification with the polio crusade, 
he requested that the publications committee develop a separate poster 
for use in black communities.118 Bynum envisioned his proposed poster 
as nearly identical to the existing national poster, except that the child 
subject would be an African American. Such an adjustment was necessary, 
he asserted, “not because of race but because it [was] impossible to dem-
onstrate the validity of [the NFIP] pledge [of equal access to treatment] 
. . . without visual evidence.”119 He explained that an African American 
poster had already been requested by state chairpersons and black volun-
teers, who planned to distribute them to 427 theaters and 32,000 schools 
across the nation.120 Anticipating the reluctance of NFIP officials based on 
a perceived deviation from the national marketing program, he assured 
them that the new poster would not be “a special appeal to a racial group” 
but a complement to the campaign. The availability of a black American 
poster, he further reasoned, might help white volunteers see the “impor-
tance of broadening the organization [and] contributor base” to black 
communities. He cited fourteen national organizations that he claimed 
already employed black promotional materials, including the YMCA, the 
National Tuberculosis Association, and the United States military.121
Members of the NFIP publications committee were initially reticent to 
approve a poster for an African American audience. They believed that 
such a development might mislead volunteers and arouse disunity. To 
rationalize their trepidation, committee members investigated how other 
national organizations advertised to specific groups. After conferring with 
the American Cancer Society, YMCA, and Boy Scouts, public relations 
advisors explained that the national organizations consulted “all [felt] 
the same way in regards to segregation and [did] not desire to make an 
issue of it.”122 Although Bynum never directly linked racial segregation 
to his proposed poster, NFIP officials believed that the correlation was 
highly symbolic. To avoid engaging in a politically divisive issue, execu-
tives implicitly claimed that the white poster child was universal and rep-
resented all Americans irrespective of their “race, creed, or color.”123 As 
a result, they believed that releasing a separate poster would be a poor 
public relations strategy, as it might imply that there were two polio fund-
raising campaigns.124 Instead, the committee advised Bynum to bring the 
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matter up again the following year and consider the prospect of a poster 
depicting “a group of children, both [black] and white” instead of “only 
[black] children.”125 Although appearing to be a compromise, the alter-
native approach failed to address the fact that the official national MOD 
poster would continue to feature only a white American child, whereas 
the compromise poster would be biracial.
Bynum neither shared committee members’ fears nor accepted their 
concession.126 Instead, he continued to seek approval for his special poster, 
as he knew that demands in the field were increasing with the approaching 
1947 MOD drive.127 In fact, county chairpersons and black volunteers in 
Cook County, Illinois, and Wayne County, Michigan, had already devel-
oped their own posters for an African American audience.128 By Novem-
ber, Bynum’s determination to launch his idea reached a climax when his 
proposal was reviewed by former New York State boxing commissioner 
turned NFIP fund-raising advisor D. Walker Wear. Wear was appalled at 
Bynum’s suggestion and wrote a scathing memo to O’Connor expressing 
his exasperation. As he explained: “I never heard of the matter [of African 
American MOD posters] until the other day when it came to me from 
publicity and I said ‘no.’ It was generally felt that we should not deviate 
from one standard child . . . through the program. We even considered a 
group of children showing several nations which has been done by other 
organizations but the answer was always ‘no.’”129
Wear followed the earlier convictions of committee members in 
articulating that the “one standard child” representing all Americans 
would continue to be white. Since Wear considered America to be a pre-
dominantly white nation, he believed that multiethnic depictions could 
only be rendered through children of other “nations.”130 Such rhetoric 
championed a supposed American homogeneity while sidestepping the 
realities posed by racial prejudice.
Although releasing a black poster concerned officials, the financial 
needs of the NFIP by 1946 warranted the consideration of new marketing 
strategies. With the death of President Roosevelt in 1945, movie houses 
across the nation abandoned collections for the MOD and as a substi-
tute provided a lump sum to the United Way and $30,000 per year to the 
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NFIP.131 As theaters had collected nearly $8 million for the polio crusade in 
1945 (approximately 44 percent of the NFIP’s gross revenue), the absence 
of their funds represented a severe loss.132 Furthermore, 1946 proved to 
be a dire year for polio outbreaks, with a record 25,698 reported cases. 
Due to pressing economic imperatives, O’Connor authorized Bynum’s 
plan with an order of three thousand copies of the existing Cook County 
black poster for national distribution.133 Through months of debate and 
agitation, Bynum had achieved a small victory.
Bynum’s special posters became a successful addition to the MOD 
campaign. Officials were satisfied with the results, but their circumspect 
printing policies and selection of child candidates upheld notions of dif-
ference. In seeking to reduce production expenses, officials stipulated 
that Bynum’s posters be dimensionally smaller (9¾ x 13¼” vs. 19 x 25” 
for the national poster) and printed in fewer colors (four colors vs. full 
color for the national poster).134 Through such policies, NFIP personnel 
implicitly situated the African American poster as somehow less important 
than the white national counterpart. Moreover, between 1947 and 1954, 
the selection of black poster children, with rare exceptions, appears to 
have favored light-skinned candidates.135 Perhaps members of the pub-
lications committee preferred subjects with lighter skin tones or Bynum 
believed such children held wider appeal to both black and white view-
ers.136 Although the African American polio posters subtly reinforced 
conceptions of whiteness as an ideal, for the first time black Americans 
were visually represented in advertising as authentic polio survivors.
By the 1950s, NFIP officials encouraged white MOD organizations 
to purchase and deploy Bynum’s posters. As with earlier practices, the 
guidelines for the utilization of these posters also reinforced difference. 
While the white national poster was purported to be best utilized in “hotel 
lobbies, railroad stations, bus terminals,” and public spaces, the black 
American poster was only “recommended for use in Negro neighbor-
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hoods” or “areas where there [was] a large Negro population.”137 Such 
rhetoric implied that African American posters were not suitable for 
mainstream society but intended only for black communities. Moreover, 
the MOD campaign guide provided no background information concern-
ing white poster children due to their existing celebrity status.138 Yet, a 
specific background case study regularly accompanied African American 
poster children, complete with the circumstances surrounding their ill-
ness, treatment, and recovery.139 Although the added detail drew needed 
attention to their plight, it also reinforced conceptions of otherness due 
to their invisibility in the white media. Despite the emphasis on difference 
in the campaign guides, the very acknowledgment of the need for black 
fund-raising materials served as an important step in reinforcing African 
Americans as legitimate partners in the MOD.
Bynum’s posters ultimately represented a civil rights triumph by mak-
ing black polio patients visible and by countering the myth that polio 
was exclusively a white disease. Although some boys served as the annual 
poster child, girls were most often featured. Like their national counter-
parts, the poses of black poster children accentuated disability and the 
specialized braces, crutches, or wheelchairs needed for mobility. More-
over, they portrayed African American polio patients in parity with white 
polio patients by demonstrating similar needs and socioeconomic status.140 
Indeed, the 1952 posters of Emma Pearl Berry (black) and Larry Jim Gross 
(white) showed nearly identical costuming and a distinctly middle-class 
representation. In such cases, children were clad either in formal attire 
or in thematic clothing, such as Berry’s buckaroo costume. Bynum was 
therefore able to reinforce parallels between black and white children 
and the irrelevance of race. The following year, symbols of racial integra-
tion emerged in Bynum’s polio posters. The Randy Donoho poster, for 
instance, depicted an African American nurse caring for a white polio 
patient, thereby situating black medical professionals in respected posi-
tions of trust. Through his posters, Bynum destabilized the concept of the 
white child as the universal American while also normalizing the practice 
of interracial cooperation.
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Complementing his posters, Bynum created special films to promote 
the MOD in black communities. Health films were already an established 
genre in American culture by the 1950s made possible by the earlier pro-
ductions of philanthropic and government health agencies.141 Bynum 
worked closely with the NFIP Radio and Film Department to develop 
short motion pictures that “emphasize[d] the Negro in the service pro-
gram of the National Foundation.”142 Films featuring African Americans 
were frequently requested by black campaign volunteers, since there were 
hundreds of segregated black movie theatres across the United States 
actively soliciting for the MOD whose “patrons criticize[d] the [national 
film] trailer for the absence or limited use of Negro subjects.”143 In order 
to appease black audiences, Bynum released Dime Power in November 
1954.144 Dime Power was a pioneering film in its attention to African 
American medical professionals, care for multiple racialized groups, and 
interracial cooperation. In celebration of the Salk vaccine field trials, 
the film opened with footage of the Tuskegee Institute laboratory and 
African American scientists dramatizing their contribution to vaccine 
research.145 Footage from the trial was incorporated, showing black and 
white medical professionals working together to administer polio immu-
nizations to African American children. Indeed, Bynum’s earlier efforts 
facilitated the inclusion of black physicians and assured black children a 
place among the 1.8 million test subjects.146 The film implied that black 
Americans were important allies in the polio crusade and that the NFIP’s 
program encouraged mutual respect devoid of racial bias. Although 
scenes depicting school segregation existed in the film, producers main-
tained an optimistic momentum by shifting focus to playing or smiling 
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children. Attention to the health needs of other racialized groups was 
also punctuated. One scene depicted Dr. Jonas Salk injecting his vac-
cine into a Japanese American child, and another showed vaccination in 
Native American communities.147 By combining these examples, Bynum 
connected the African American civil rights struggle with the civil rights 
aims of other racialized groups. To maximize emotional appeal, the later 
portion of the film focused on convalescent polio treatment. Not only 
were black Americans shown receiving physical therapy and specialized 
nursing care but Latino children were included in a scene with young 
“Pedro . . . developing his muscle power.” Bynum’s message was clear: all 
children, regardless of race prejudice, shared identical human qualities 
and health needs.
Bridging Communities and Fighting Prejudice, 1944 –1954
Due to his prior service with the Commission for Inter-racial Coop-
eration, Bynum believed that proactive field work would permit him to 
“bridge” black and white communities for the benefit of the entire NFIP 
program. He therefore spent countless months away from headquarters 
meeting with chapter volunteers, reassuring black leaders, and gaining 
an understanding of each locality’s race relations climate.148 When visiting 
white county chapter volunteers, Bynum frequently encouraged them to 
initiate contact with black communities and invite African Americans to 
serve on committees. Although he was usually well received by white vol-
unteers, he was rarely successful in convincing them to strive for integra-
tion.149 Through gentle persistence and emerging economic imperatives, 
however, a handful of county chapters extended membership to black 
Americans by the late 1940s. In April 1947, the Dade County, Florida, 
chapter reported the addition of a “Negro representative” to its board.150 
Similarly, the Miller-Bowie chapter of Texas extended membership to one 
black representative in 1944, three in 1946, and nine in 1948.151 Although 
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these developments increased civil rights momentum and strengthened 
the NFIP grassroots program, few chapters ultimately achieved integrated 
status.
Since most chapters and their affiliated MOD organizations failed to 
desegregate, Bynum was forced to sustain and facilitate separate black 
fund-raising divisions. During field trips, he actively solicited qualified 
residents in black communities to serve in the forthcoming campaign.152 
He reasoned that chairpersons must be the “very best leaders in their com-
munities,” with experience organizing events or operating a business.153 
Once a leader was designated, Bynum helped in the recruitment of a 
black MOD fund-raising team. A growing awareness of the NFIP meant 
that enthusiastic black volunteers were usually easy to find. “I found that 
all you had to do was to go into a community and ask the high school 
principal, the physician, or somebody and say that we need some helpers. 
And they were glad to be asked,” Bynum remembered.154 As soon as a black 
division was in place, Bynum notified the white campaign chairperson of 
its existence and sought mutual assurances of cooperation.155 Maintaining 
collaboration proved an ongoing challenge, as Bynum explained: “There 
is a gulf between Negro leadership and [white] campaign leadership 
which I must bridge to the advantage of both parties. . . . Blindfolded, I 
am eternally dancing on eggs and I must never break them. During the 
dance I must find questionable eggs and juggle them until elimination is 
accomplished.”156 He often relayed his concerns over “questionable eggs” 
to NFIP state representatives, requesting their adjudication or replace-
ment of antagonistic individuals.157 Bynum thus shaped segregated fund-
raising to ensure competency and a measure of tolerance among black 
and white chairpersons.
To prepare black MOD chairpersons for their responsibilities, Bynum 
established a separate conference paralleling the exclusionary regional 
precampaign meetings.158 The resulting Tuskegee Conference for Cam-
paign Leadership was a pioneering annual event first launched in 1946 
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to “bridge gaps in the campaign organization,” train black fund-raising 
leaders, and provide attendees with a sense of “belonging” to the national 
polio crusade.159 Black delegates were selected to attend through either the 
nomination of a white chapter or by the personal invitation of Bynum.160 
As a black professional, Bynum was selective in whom he invited, favor-
ing candidates of his own socioeconomic class with a suitable educational 
background.161 Organizing the conference proved an enormous undertak-
ing for both Bynum and the NFIP.162 As he once mused: “Our meetings 
at Tuskegee involve my office in a maze of detail, detail which requires 
me to function as a representative of Public Relations, Fund Raising and 
Chapter Departments. At Tuskegee, I must function as Hotel manager, 
state representative, state March of Dimes chairman, county campaign 
director, city campaign director and state women’s advisor.”163 In spite 
of overwhelming duties, Bynum enjoyed the attention and coveted the 
diverse roles, as they allowed him to sustain direct contact with delegates 
and remain the locus of race relations for the NFIP.
To provide attendees with a sense of “belonging,” Bynum encouraged 
headquarters executives to attend the conference and make presenta-
tions.164 The celebrity factor attributed to NFIP directors became a prime 
motivation for many black representatives to attend, as few had ever 
met such high-ranking officials.165 According to Bynum, the director of 
chapters, Warren Coss, became a “favorite,” since he “grapple[d] with 
the delegates’ problems and [sought] constructive solutions.”166 In this 
respect, the precampaign meeting followed earlier methods employed by 
the Commission for Inter-racial Cooperation and the Annual Tuskegee 
Negro Conferences, which brought together white and black leaders to 
nurture a common purpose of reducing prejudice.167
While bolstering black delegate morale, the conference was thoroughly 
didactic. Delegates learned of the NFIP medical training and polio treat-
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ment programs by touring the Tuskegee Infantile Paralysis Center, where 
they met black polio patients, nurses, and physicians.168 In turn, the MOD 
marketing sessions featured advice on the importance of “emotional 
appeal” and the deployment of “campaign materials.”169 NFIP state repre-
sentatives presented on the duties of chairpersons and espoused strategies 
for fund-raising in racially segregated communities.170 Bynum monitored 
these discussions carefully and often censored fellow staff members if 
they strayed into complex racially charged issues.171 He reminded them 
“to treat all [black] subjects exactly as they would be treated at any other 
campaign meeting” and warned that if a question from a delegate was 
“loaded,” he would personally “beat the gun” with a suitable answer.172 By 
intervening in panel discussions, Bynum hoped to avert racist remarks 
that could undermine the spirit of cooperation. Through this intensive 
schedule, black delegates acquired key fund-raising strategies, an oppor-
tunity to voice their concerns, and a broader appreciation of the NFIP. 
The conference generated optimism and contributed to the public health 
work of African Americans nationwide.173
Bynum’s compromise strategy of acknowledging the reality of seg-
regation while lobbying for its demise facilitated the inclusion of black 
Americans in the crusade without threatening white hegemony. Black 
and white neighborhoods became loosely joined in a segregated yet allied 
fund-raising program, as 1947 marked the “first year that participation of 
Negroes [in the MOD became] nation-wide.”174 Even in segregated south-
ern communities, such as Birmingham, Alabama, opposition to inter-
racial fund-raising was overcome, and black campaign volunteers were 
reportedly “elated by [the] type of cooperation extended by [the white] 
campaign chair.”175 MOD revenue steadily increased, and by the 1950s 
Bynum claimed that up to 5 percent of all monies gathered in the North 
and 10 to 25 percent in the South could be attributed to African Ameri-
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can donors.176 Although fund-raising success stories spurred interracial 
cooperation, sweeping MOD campaign integration was not achieved.177
Conclusion
Between 1938 and 1944, the NFIP and its subsidiary organizations 
remained attentive to the health needs and participation of white Ameri-
cans. Although the NFIP program funded acute care and a measure of 
segregated convalescent care for black American polio patients, officials 
considered their inclusion in county chapters and the MOD unprofitable 
and risky. In spite of this reality, many black Americans actively engaged 
in fund-raising and sought to become equal partners in the polio crusade. 
It was not until financial demands peaked, the threat of a racially divisive 
campaign emerged, and civil rights lobbying achieved mainstream atten-
tion that NFIP officials were motivated to act. O’Connor’s decision to hire 
Charles H. Bynum as director of “Negro Activities” was both an expression 
of liberal attitudes and an act of desperation. Despite an uncertain job 
description and limits to his authority, Bynum fostered working relation-
ships with fellow staff and influenced national policy for the benefit of 
his employer and African Americans. Between 1944 and 1954, he aided 
the NFIP to slowly integrate acute polio wards and improve the quality 
of segregated convalescent care across the nation. Through diplomacy, 
personal attention, and suitable publicity materials, Bynum achieved the 
inclusion of black Americans in the MOD fund-raising program. In the 
midst of the 1949 polio epidemic, three-year-old Emma Pearl Berry would 
benefit from the culmination of these developments and later participate 
in the very crusade that made her treatment possible.
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